There are numerous opportunities to apply electronic commerce technologies to networking. These include the assembly, pricing, and payments for complementary infrastructure resources, and the selection of and payment for value-added collaboration and information access services. EC can support the separate provision and coordlnation of these elements, or allow them to be bundled by a f'undamcntal in~ras1tuc:turc is coralrectivicustomer care organization. These opportunities and options are discussed.
nates a broker. to obtain competitive bids and configure 11 service option. Upon a rcqucst from the brokcr, sets of providers controlling complenxntary resources (like subnetworks forming end-to-cnd connectivity) form a temporary syndicate to gcneratc a bid, and provision and charge if thc bid is accepted. An arbiter designated by each syndicate coordinates individual resource managers, gathers price bids from the managcrs, and aggregates thc results as a bid to thc broker. For cxamplc, tllc broker may spccify end-to-cnd delay objcctives, and the arbiter coordinates complementary subnetworks to partition that delay among subnetworks and gather the rcsulting prices. The broker, arbitcrs, and resource managers may bc software agents transportcd to a single host for negotiation i n minimum time 14-61. Competitive bidding is not essential to this model. Sccnarios similar to Fig. 3 are an interesting topic for research. Each syndicate wants to minimize its price bid to maximize the chance of winning. If em-to-end QoS attributcs must bc disaggregated to individual suhnctworks, minimizing pricc rcquircs an additional negotiation among resource managcrs; Cor example, wircless access links and congested subnetworks would be allocated the greatest impairments. Mechanized negotiations of this type have bcen studied hy cconomists. dcpcnd on location), who has predefined fixed-price contracts with complementary providers. EC could allow pricing to be dynamic -at the expense of increased (although hopefully modest) transaction costs -and also enable diffcrentiatcd QoS guarantees with associated pricing. Providers could vary prices at will, based, for example, on rcquestcd QoS, current traffic conditions, and indications of user willingness to pay. Transaction costs can bc reduced by overprovisioning facilitics to provide superb QoS to all users (although this is unlikely in wireless access networks). To evaluate these alternatives, transaction costs should be compared to thc value added to both users and providcrs. They are worthwhile if that valuc is grcatcr, as measured by user willingness to pay and/or economic advantages to the provider. This value proposition is now discusscd, first for users and then for providcrs. Thc many issues reiscd hcre are complex and poorly understood; thcrc is no "right" answer at the present state of
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
Value to the User -QoS configuration accommodates diffcrcntiation by user functionality and user prcfcrencc. As an extreme cxample, telesargery has morc stringent requircments than emaii. If the nctwork provisions differentiated QoS, associatcd pricing is incvitablc, since otherwise a rational user would always choosc the highest QoS option.
During congestion -primarily an issuc limited to wireless access subnetworks in the Enturc -resources must be rationed, and pricing is thc usual mechanism for matching supply and demand. As a form of congcstion control, willingness to pay voluntarily distinguishes compclling needs from those that can be 96 dcfcrred. All other forms of congestion control arc involuntaly; a uscr may he unable to obtain desired resources no mattcr how compelling the need. QoS also shifts risk from thc user to the provider, incrcasing value and willingness to pay.
Competitive bidding for scrvices increases competition and reduces price. It also obviates user lock-in to providers duc to switching costs (which allows providers to incrcase prices) IS]. Bidding also allows easier market entry, increasing competition. Scc the article by Vielmetti in this issue. Policy Issues -Vcrsioning can address universal service (expanding service to a wide segtncnt of the population) hy a market mcchanism. With fixed priccs, providers tend t o ignore users with less willingucss to pay in the pursuit of maximum rcvcnues. It is socially tlcsirahlc for higher-quality vcrsions to bc offered without prccluding lowcr-quality optiom for thosc able t o pay less.
Value t o Providers
Interprovidcr QoS provisioning is important t o prcservc cornpctition in thc industry, and may as a result be mandated. To scc this, assume thcrc are two service providers. Each user dcrivcs greater valuc when connected to a larger universe o f users, including those of the other provider -this is callcd a network externality -s o the providers will likely nlakc intcl.-connect arrangements. Iiowever, if 00s is more prcdictablc staying within a single provider's facilities, uscrs prcfcr the network with thc larger user hnsc, biasing the market toward a dominant provider. ty, encompassing both infrastructurc and uscr functionality, as shown in Fig. 4 . It could provide secure, evolvablc, and anonymous payment mechanisms [13] , and subsume thc role of the broker in Fig. 3 . It also addresses the proliferation of advanced user functionality and providers, much as credit card associations arose to mediate among c o~~s u m c r s , hanks, and merchants. Finally, it rclicvcs the user of worrying about different underlying network organizations and thc hybrid charactcr of services [ 121.
OTHER lSSUES EXPLOITING A COMMON EC INFRASTRUCTURE
Historically, infrastructure services have been provided by subscription with direct monthly aggregated billing. UMTS continues this tradition. EC enables othcr business models such as immediate payment for services. Rathcr than each provider providing separate user billing, a common sharcd billing infrastructurc, similar to the credit card associations, could be developed. This may be morc flcxiblc and cost-cffcctive, and rcducc credit risk to providers.
AUTHENTICATION AND PRIVACY
A necessary ingredient of EC, user authcntication to prcvcnt fraud, has a major downside for users in the loss of privacy. Authentication allows providers to log user activities, and data warehousing and mining potentially allow tracing and aggregation across a variety of suppliers and providers. Without definitive privacy policies, thc development of a dynamic rnarket may be stifled. A customer care organization can preserve user anonymity and enforce privacy policies. See the article by Wing and O'Higgins in this issuc.
CONCLUSION
EC can support both infrastructure and user functionality scrvices, bundled or unbundled. These opportunities enable greater choice and compctition, hopefully without inconvenience or transaction costs. Research is needed to fully qualify and quantify these opportunities. His research activity is focused on service engineering, with a special emphasis on multimedia services: more recently this focus was extended to security and mobile applications. He has authored and co-authored more than 40 publications in this area and holds several related patents. He defined the new communication systems curriculum a t EPFL (www.epfl.ch) and will chair t h e Communication Systems Divislon starting In October 1999.
